3 argue, this same dynamic can also create space for inter-elite accommodations that can slowly transform politics in ways often unaccounted for in the conventional transitions literature.
To explore these changes I will trace the genesis and evolution of institutional and symbolic legacies in Iran and Indonesia. Following this, I consider how recent struggles to redefine these legacies have facilitated the efforts of regime and opposition elites to discredit, challenge or renegotiate the rules of the game. In Iran, the struggle of the "Islamic Left" to reinterpret Khomeini's legacy in a more pluralistic light helped set the stage for a reform movement. But because this movement has clashed with a rival institutional-ideological path that was controlled by the "Supreme Leader" and his allies in powerful state institutions, its efforts to liberalize the political system have been stymied. In contrast to this example of bi-polar dissonant conflict, Indonesia provides an example of multipolar competition between and within competing Islamic and secular groups. In this article, I focus on the competition between two of the most important Islamic groups, one of whose leaders --Abdurrahman Wahid --played a key role in forging a contentious experiment in confessional power sharing virtually unprecedented in the Islamic world. In the conclusion I recap some of the theoretical lessons suggested by this study. I then briefly contrast politics in dissonant states to their conceptual opposite: harmonic states. By narrowing the space for regime-opposition accommodations, and by glorifying the notion of the state as the sole voice of the community or umma, harmonic states invite a "fight to death" between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. While Algeria offers the most dramatic example of this destructive zero-sum logic, it may not be the last one to pay the high costs that ensue from a legacy of harmonic authoritarianism.
Dissonant Institutionalization: A Theoretical Sketch
This article is informed by Theda Skockpol's assumption that "various sorts of states...give rise to various conceptions of the meaning and method of 'politics' itself, conceptions that influence all groups and classes in national societies." Spurning all linear theories, he argues for an "anthropology of the state" that investigates how the organizational and symbolic ties that link state and society promote distinctive patterns of political change. Migdal neither assumes that the state is a coherent entity that creates and enforcers preferences, nor that it is a prisoner of society's competing social forces. Instead, he argues that different levels of stateness affect the goals and strategies that regimes and oppositions pursue. Migdal suggests that political change depends on whether the balance of power between state and society produces "total transformation" of the second by the first, "state incorporation" of existing forces, "societal incorporation" of the state, or a total failure of the latter to penetrate the state. World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) . Their use of organizational and symbolic resources limits the kinds of strategies and techniques that weak states can employ to mobilize, control or contain strong societies. Constrained by their societies, weak states are better at dominating than transforming, controlling than changing, surviving than innovating.
Capabilities in the Third
The notion of "dissonant institutionalization" turns this argument on it head. Whereas Migdal holds that competing socio-political forces often constrain ruling elites, I see the prevalence of such forces as a spur not only to regime survival, but within limits, to regime innovation and controlled change. Migdal's "state incorporation" hints at this dynamic but is not equivalent to dissonant institutionalization. When state incorporation occurs, the state retains a measure of autonomy sufficient to achieve domination, but it is still compelled by societal forces to act in some ways and not in others. By contrast, dissonant institutionalization obtains when the state has abetted the institutionalization of contradictory visions of authority in organizations, parties or groups which maintain a degree of autonomy, or at the least some capacity to define preferences independently of the state. These groups can be states.
x Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) . Indeed, what makes the concept of dissonant politics useful is that it highlights a dynamic that can unfold in traditional monarchies such as Morocco, in populist authoritarian regimes such as Egypt, or in revolutionary or post-revolutionary states such as Iran.
Dissonant politics pivots around the institutional and ideological space that distances contending societal organizations both from the state, and from one another. The competition by the leaders of these organizations for popular support hinders the efforts of any one group to impose ideological hegemony, while relative autonomy and elite competition facilitates both the state's manipulation of competing elites, and the latter's efforts to manipulate the state. Still, it is usually the state which prevails. By encouraging contending elites to constantly negotiate particular policy questions, or to debate this or that symbolic issue, the state enhances its room for maneuver and thus benefits from the specter of institutionalized conflict.
xi should be noted that Coser's analysis focused on Western, pluralistic democracies. Divide and rule and elite accommodation are thus two sides of the same coin.
Some of the most dissonant states in the Middle East are ruled by monarchs whose staying power stems from their ability to play off traditional and modern groups. The result, as the cases of Morocco and Kuwait suggest, is a game in which negotiations over particular socio-cultural issues (such as women's rights) gives competing groups a sense that their positions "count" without allowing them to pose a serious threat to the ruling powers.
xii Political Dualism,"
Middle East Policy, Vol. 5 , No. 4, January 1998, 104-30. Dissonant politics is a product of many factors, three of which bear particular comment. First, it is an outgrowth of strategies of indirect rule through which colonial powers promoted indigenous political elites. 
Renegotiating and Redefining Dissonant Legacies
While in dissonant systems elites, institutions and ideologies are in a state of constant competition and contention, absent a system-threatening crisis this discordant dynamic is unlikely to produce a major renegotiation of the rules of the game. Such a crisis can be economic, and/or ideological. While the first has been widely studied, the second merits close attention. xix (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995 those which maintain considerable symbolic and institutional distance from society's competing socio-cultural groups, and which promote a multi-polar symbolic field-create more space for renegotiating the rules of the game.
Conversely, states which are moderately dissonant-i.e., those which narrow the symbolic and institutional distance between state and society, and which constrain the degree of ideological and institutional dissonance by limiting competition to a bi-polar ideological field, create less space for renegotiating the political/symbolic order. In short, the chances for a more dramatic renegotiation of the political field will be greater in the first than the second.
Second, the particular institutional mechanisms which regimes use to manage dissonance also affect struggles to renegotiate the rules of the game. States which rule through centralized control organizations such as single party systems will be relatively more constrained than those which use corporatist, monarchical or other institutions to distance themselves from the process of ideological or symbolic reproduction.
The above model suggests a counter-intuitive dynamic: the more dissonant an institutional and ideological legacy, the more opportunities there are for "regime survival strategies" through which rulers encourage inter-elite accommodations that prevent a full transition to multi-party democracy. 
Bi-Polar Dissonant Institutionalization in Iran
Iran's 1978-79 Islamic revolution was led by an alliance between two overlapping socio-ideological forces.
On the "Islamist Left" was a disparate movement of university students, professors, independent intellectuals, and some radical clerics, all of whom to various degrees had been exposed to This document provided for a faqih or Ruling Jurist whose nearly unlimited powers derived from the "people's" embrace of Khomeini and his messianic message; a judiciary and "Council of Guardians" controlled by the conservative clergy; and a Majles whose members were elected every five years. Revolution" (as they were called) were moving from Islamic Bolshevism to Islamic Menchivism. This trend was an outgrowth of dissonant institutionalization; it stemmed from a redefinition from within one ideological path that had been shaped by the very elites who were now trying to redefine it. And it was precisely because they had chartered this path that transforming it proved tricky. For apart from the other imposing path that Islamist Leftists had to contend with --the Clerical Right's control of powerful institutions such as the Office of the Faqih, the Judiciary, and the Council of Guardians-Islamic Leftists faced an imposing dilemma: how to advance notions of political participation, the rule of law, and rational political dialogue without appearing to betray the very revolutionary principles of "Islamic" government and cultural independence which Khomeini had championed.
Two "Children of the Revolution" played key roles in addressing this dilemma: Mohammad Khatami and Abdolkarim Soroush. Although the first was a cleric and the second a lay intellectual, both were Islamic Leftists experience, Soroush tried to forge a vision of political reform that was both spiritually inspiring and politically rational.
The Limits of Path Innovation in Post-Khomeini Iran
The revisionist ideas advanced by Khatami and Soroush were echoed by a growing body of lay intellectuals, and by several leading clerics such as Ayatollah Mohammad Montazeri and his student Mohsen
Kadivar. This lay-clerical alliance directed its message to the colleges and universities. By 1996, the two offered a mass arena through which the reformists could mobilize nearly one million students. Moreover, despite the state's efforts, it had failed to completely purge the universities of Western-trained academics, or to remove social science and humanities curricula which included significant doses of Western political theory. Despite this progress, the struggle that Khatami and his allies waged from the Spring of 1997 through the Spring of 2000 demonstrated that dissonant institutionalization was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, Khatami and his allies had reinterpreted a major path of the Revolution to legitimate a pluralistic agenda. That they did so through, rather than against, Khomeini's eclectic vision showed that a state which had aspired to ideological hegemony had bequeathed a dissonant legacy. But that same state had also generated a competing institutional- Khomeini's authority. In short, the 1989 Constitution set up a potential conflict between a president whose authority derived from modern, legal-rational procedures and principles, and a faqih whose formal authority emanated from a traditionalized office and ideology. That said, the potential for a "faqih versus president" conflict seems to have been anticipated in the l989 Constitution. By expanding the institutional powers of the faqih over bodies such as the military and the police, it gave the Supreme Leader the means and right to limit the president's authority. This balancing act worked fairly well during the first two years of Khatami's presidency. While Khatami promoted the opposition press, called for a "dialogue of civilization" and made speeches in favor of Majles "rights,"
freedom of opinion and the rule of law, Khamanei attacked the West, issued periodic threats against the reform movement, and condoned the judiciary's periodic closures of opposition newspapers and the arrests of their editors.
But when such acts encouraged their most militant followers to push the proverbial envelope, Khatami and Khamanei would draw together. For example, after a July 1999 attack by security forces on a dorm at Tehran University, Khatami called for restraint from the students while Khamanei praised the president while warning his hard-line allies that they should not take the law into their own hands. In 1960 Clifford Geertz described this division in terms of "santri" versus "abangan," or devout versus nominal
Muslims. The authority of the abangan, he argued, stemmed from a pre-Islamic symbolic system whose patrimonialist ethos was deeply rooted in rural Java. Although Muhammadiya and NU were competitors, there differences were at times obscured by their competition with the secular-nationalist parties. Yet as shall see, in as much as NU sought to prevent the state from becoming a vehicle of Islamization, its leaders often felt more comfortable supporting the ruling Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and/or its various successors and rivals, such as the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and Golkar, (the official ruling party established in 1967). By mediating between Muhammadiya and the nationalist parties, NU helped sustain a multi-polar ideological field that encouraged inter-elite competition, negotiations and accommodations.
After Indonesia won independence in 1945 Sukarno attempted to accommodate (and control) this multipolar field by using several devices, one of which was an eclectic ideology known as "Pancasila." A Sanskrit term meaning "five principles," the first principle of Pancasila was "belief in God." While all Indonesians were expected to follow one of the monotheistic religions, it was understood that all religious practices would issue from society Relative autonomy facilitated an elaborate game by which Indonesia's presidents and their allies tried to divide or coopt their opponents, while the latter tried to use state bodies such as the Ministry of Religion to advance their agendas. In the resulting confluence of party and elite politics it became "all to easy for rival claimants to power to conclude that the only rational way to engage in politics is to work behind the scenes, forging alliances with ascendant factions in the ruling elite and taking care not to push for broader political participation."
lii Nation-States,
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Conflict and Accommodation Under Sukarno
While we cannot analyze this game in detail, we must highlight how three of its central features eventually facilitated a transition to power sharing and democratic reform: first, the competition between modernist and traditionalist Islamic parties to defend their constituencies and ideologies by using the state while at the same time 
Rationalizing Dissonant Politics: State/Society Dynamics under Suharto
Suharto attempted to succeed where Sukarno had failed by repudiating the latter's quasi-socialist economic policies, by further centralizing the system of bureaucratic control, by enhancing the power of the military, and by purging both communist and Islamic militants. This purge was accomplished by a cynical maneuver: in 1965 and 1966, Sukarno's allies mobilized Islamic groups, and particularly the student wing of the NU (Ansar) in an anticommunist campaign. When the bloodletting ceased with some 500,000 dead, NU leaders were rewarded; whereas nearly every ministry was reduced in scope and power, the Ministry of Religion was expanded. Moreover, while
Suharto revived the lower and upper houses of parliament, he imposed controls that not only assured the government of a majority, but also gave the regime almost unlimited powers to select candidates for both the ruling Golkar Party and for the "opposition" parties. In the run up to the 1971 elections, Suharto used these powers to purge of Islamists from which NU emerged virtually unscathed.
Yet while the state became more autocratic, dissonant politics endured as each faction within the ideologically eclectic elite tried to repackage the ideological legacies of the previous era. A key element in this contest was the battle to re-appropriate Pancasila. In the late sixties Suharto, as well several leading intellectuals and military officers, began advocating the view that Pancasila constituted an "organic" ideology that reflected the intrinsic "personality" of the Indonesian people. Retaliating against this apparent effort to impose Javanese-Hindu identity, the Islamic parties (including the NU) called for reintroducing a controversial section of the "Jakarta As a result, NU found itself on the receiving end of hostility from both. In late 1971 the government ended NU's 18-year control of the Ministry of Religion by appointing an intellectual technocrat as minister.
Path Innovation in the NU: From Traditionalism to Liberalism?
These events had a transformatory effect on NU that was similar to changes that would unfold within Iran's Islamic Left twenty years later. By the early seventies, the politicization of NU's leadership had provoked a profound process of rethinking among a group of students and political activists. Known as the "Generation of 66," they had expected to benefit from their implicit alliance with the New Order. Instead, they found that Muslims had been drawn into a morass of political conflict that was deflecting NU from promoting its cultural and ethical goals.
Seeking to remedy this problem, several intellectual/political activists began to redefine NU's traditionalist ideology.
In the ensuing decade, they showed that a symbolic-institutional path that had long played a central role in which is other than God, namely the world, its problems and values...To sacralize anything other than God is, in reality, shirk (polytheism)." To make this case for "desacralization" Madjid turned to mystical ideas that were rooted deeply in Indonesian society. Invoking a central tenet of mysticism, he argued that "because God is the Ultimate Absolute...beyond the ken of human comprehension," it was a sacrilidge to assume that man could transform God's mysteries into mundane ideology. The remedy was to embrace a form of "secularization" that would strengthen response from Muslim politicians and anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta in1984, it appeared that irreparable harm had been done to Pancasila's ability to symbolize inter-confessional compromise.
The dilemma facing Wahid was how to revive Pancasila's dissonant spirit without appearing to endorse Suharto's efforts to monopolize the ideological field. NU's 1984 Congress not only provided a chance to address this dilemma, but to secure support for Wahid's neo-modernist vision. Seizing upon the disenchantment of NU's clerics with old guard of NU politicians, Wahid and his colleague Achmad Siddiq mounted a successful campaign to be elected general chairman and executive director of NU. They then convinced their followers to endorse two decisions: first, that NU would stop all participation in the state-controlled party system in order to focus is energies on promoting social and cultural reform on a grass roots level; and second, that NU would formally accept Pancasila and the1945 Constitution as the final bases of state authority. But NU's leaders also stipulated that they had were adopting Pancasila because it provided a framework in which all groups could pursue their religious faith. As Siddiq put it in a famous formula that echoed Madjid's mystical liberalism, in so far as Pancasila was a "philosophy created by human beings" whereas Islam was "a revelation," the former could provide the foundation for freely pursuing for the latter. By design or default, Siddiq's formula served the interests of both the government and NU. In the ensuing two years, the government adopted his distinction between philosophy and revelation to convince other Islamic organizations that there was no contradiction between Islam and Pancasila. That Suharto decided at the same time to cease the campaign to Javanize Pancasila, and to declare it instead an "open ideology," encouraged other Islamic leaders to renounce the notion of an Islamic state in favor of a society-based movement for "cultural Islam." As for NU, by withdrawing from a political arena that had been manipulated by the state, it was now free, in Wahid's words, to develop "an alternative view of Pancasila," that was both non-sectarian and democratic. For the PKB, this messy political field offered opportunities. While it had never won more than 18.7 percent of the vote, NU's moderate credentials put the PKB in a position to chart a mid-way course between the secular PDI-P and the Islamic parties. Although a stroke had left him half blind and weak, Wahid tried to secure a "contingent institutional compromise" (or political pact) that would advance democratic reforms without ceding the field to exponents of radical or precipitous changes. That retaliation came a month later, when at a Jakarta rally marking the end of Ramadan, Haz suggested to an audience of some 80,000 that the Central Axis parties should reconsider their support for Wahid. Rais agreed.
After disclosing that PPP, PAN, the Crescent Star and Justice parties had signed a pact that called for uniting the four parties into one single party in advance of the 2004 elections, Rais turned to the situation in the Moluccas
Islands. "Thus far," he warned, "Muslims have been quiet patient, but even that has limits." The President, he demanded, had to resolve the fighting "in one or two weeks," or otherwise the Muslims might be "wiped out."
Amien and Haz then endorsed a proposal --made by several leading clerics --that unless the government quickly halted the violence, a holy war or jihad would be launched against Christians.
lxxix Nevertheless, such a call was obviously irresponsible and dangerous.
Haz and Rais surely knew that even the slightest hint of carrying out this threat would provoke a coup.
While Wahid's decision in January to retire General Wiranto-and thus remove him from the cabinet -made such a move less likely, the military retained the means to intervene. That it failed to do so may be attributed not merely to Wahid's bold actions (which were wisely applauded by the United States), but also to the fact that despite their differences, the Central Axis parties had little choice but to cooperate with Wahid and Megawati. Wahid himself often undermined such cooperation by making unilateral decisions that dismayed cabinet members from both secular and religious parties. For their part, the Islamic parties continued to make life difficult for Wahid. proposal (which, it should be noted, both Rais and Wahid rejected) to reintroduce the portion of the "Jakarta Charter" that called for the application of Islamic law.
However disconcerting, such developments have unfolded in a multi-polar symbolic-institutional field that has made it hard for any one faction to impose its will. Indeed, despite the push to introduce the Jakarta Charter's Shariah section, the leaders of PDI-P, PKB and PAN continued to support the principle of keeping religion and state at arms length. Thus as I shall discuss below, it is unlikely that Indonesia will follow the sad example of Algeria, where the effort by militant Islamists to use democracy as a vehicle for imposing a counter-hegemonic project provoked a military coup and civil war. In Indonesia, political liberalization and power sharing are not Trojan horses for radical Islamization; rather they express a legacy of dissonant politics whose enduring logic is manifest in a politics of confrontation, brinkmanship and negotiation among forces that have long advocated contending visions of community.
Conclusion: Dissonant Versus Harmonic Politics
This article has provided several useful theoretical guideposts for understanding dissonant politics in Islamic polities. In particular, I have deployed the concepts of multiple "paths" and "imaginations" to illuminate patterns of political change and negotiation that are not readily revealed by conventional analyses of regime transitions. But this has merely been a first step. Further studies of other dissonant states, such as Lebanon and Kuwait, must now be undertaken. If analyses of these and other dissonant states affirms my central hypothesis --namely, that the institutionalization of multiple symbolic-institutional paths not only creates the space for regimeopposition accommodations, but also encourages ideological innovation within Islamic movements--then we will be on our way to forging a comprehensive middle range theory of dissonant politics. With this caveat in mind, I
would like to highlight three important lessons for the future study of comparative politics in general, and dissonant "Islamic" politics in particular, suggested by this study.
First, dissonant politics generates patterns of political change which do not move forward (or backwards) along one clear line. The notion that transitions involve the negotiation of a "bargained equilibrium" that allows political leaders to either move forward to democracy, or back to a more coherent and competitive democracy --that many scholars once hoped would become a universal trend has not materialized. In a world in which there is no end of history, accounting for different political systems and the outcomes they generate remains a key challenge for students of comparative politics.
Second, while the multiple legacies bequeathed by dissonant states are never static, they are not the mere handmaidens of a wider economic logic that can be arbitrarily molded by political entrepreneurs. In Indonesia, the on-going economic crisis has certainly weakened the urban middle class and thus facilitated the efforts of the PPP to mobilize support for a more sectarian vision of Islam. By contrast, in Iran, economic crisis has strengthened support for the Khordad Front, although efforts to impose economic reforms--if they ever come --may provoke a backlash against the reformists. Yet while the ideological legacies inherited by that the leaders of Iran and Indonesia have been affected by socio-economic conditions, these leaders have discovered that the political logic that animates these legacies cannot be completely reinvented. President Khatami, for example, has redefined the ideology of the Islamic left in a more liberal direction. But he cannot easily expunge from this ideology the calculated nativism which gave it such force. Similarly, while President Wahid has tried to push the long standing practice of elite competition in a more pluralistic direction, the well ingrained but destructive habit of viewing politics as a game of political one upmanship has endured.
lxxxi Pos Pupang, July14, 1998 ," in FIBS East Asia, July 24, 1998 . In short, in both Indonesia and Iran, we have vivid examples of the shared "scripts" and "routines" which have received attention from new institutionalist scholars. What I have done is to show how such scripts and habits can be studied through a dynamic comparative lense that does not reduce them to reified structures that predetermine political outcomes. 
